1 Introduction

“[Media] messages significantly influence what the public thinks by shaping what they think about”. It is evident that media plays a critical role in gathering and disseminating information, and subsequently “influence nearly every aspect of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy”. Following this logic, Australian media have contributed to Australians’ public opinion and foreign policy about China’s soft power promotions.

Soft power and public diplomacy are two different but connected concepts. Soft power, according to Nye, refers to the ability to get what a country wants by the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies rather than coercion and payments. A country might obtain what it wants in international circumstances because its values, prosperity and positiveness are admired by other countries. Tuch defined public diplomacy as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies”. D’Hooghe linked the two concepts by identifying public diplomacy as “a tool that may wield and generate soft power by linking soft power resources to preferred outcomes”. Public diplomacy is one essential instrument for the development of soft power. The instrument of soft power refers to the “mechanisms through which an applicant transmits the influential capacity of its sources to the receivers” . In China, most of the soft power objectives are realised through conducting public diplomacy activities such as cultural and educational exchanges and media outreach. As Wang put it, “the task of enhancing China’s soft power falls to public diplomacy”. Therefore, despite the fact that the soft power concept is broader than public diplomacy, given China’s soft power activities often falls into the category of public diplomacy, they frequently co-occur in academic and official documents.

Several studies have attempted to analyse media perceptions of Chinese individual forms of soft power such as Confucius Institutes, Belt and Road Initiative, cultural exchanges. These studies typically focus on one specific aspect of soft power. For example, a study might examine the influence of Confucius Institutes for the purpose of building a positive national image as a soft power tool. However, there are two gaps in these studies. One is that very few articles examine China’s soft power perceptions in Australian media. The other is that there is a lack of literature that explores the collective influence of China’s soft power as a comprehensive concept. In this study, the researcher takes a holistic approach to examine how Australian mainstream media views China’s soft power and how the media frames this soft power influence in its coverage.

This study can make two contributions. Firstly, to distinctly comprehend how Australia media views China’s soft power efforts, this study describes and analyses the Australian media’s perceptions of China’s soft power and public diplomacy through providing a summary of the main themes and frames. The analysis may have practical implications for public diplomacy practices for China and Australia, as well as countries that are striving to improve their efficiency in public diplomacy activities. In addition, this paper is able to contribute to understanding of the dynamics at play, including the tensions which surface in the China-Australia bilateral relationship from time to time.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Media and China’s soft power  

Nye defined soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” and stated that soft power originates primarily from three resources: culture, political values, and foreign policies. These have largely been adopted by Chinese administrations. However, China’s soft power concept is contextualised in terms of scope and application, sources, and cultural focus. China’s soft power includes not only “popular culture and public diplomacy”, but also “economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations”.

There are two types of research on media and China’s soft power. The first regards media as an instrument of China’s soft power. For example, Yang explored the context of China’s “media going global” policy and implementation though scrutinizing rationalities, methods and beliefs. The research revealed that to globalise China’s media, China still needs to address issues regarding cultural differences. In the same vein, Yuan studied global Chinese media and how it affects American audiences’ opinions about China. The findings illustrated clear examples of news as a tool for soft power to shape any country’s image in intercultural communication.

Another strand of literature regards media as the carrier of soft power narratives, examining how media covers and frames China’s soft power. This type of research focuses on single cases of soft power. Metzgar and Su examined American media reportage of Confucius Institutes in the United States over a period of twelve years and concluded that most media articles do not cover Confucius Institutes in a broader context concerning the rationale behind the project. Among them, some explore the differences between media in different countries or in different media outlets in the same country. Xiao, Li and Hu used critical discourse analysis to examine media construction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), one of China’s leading economy and soft power projects, in China and the United States. They revealed that, despite media in both countries paying attention to BRI, they are different in other aspects: Chinese media focuses on the concrete measures, while American media emphasises political influence.

2.2 Australia-China Relationship

Australia-China relationship has went through ups and downs, characterised with engagement and tension. It is important to discuss the bilateral diplomatic ties as it provides insights into the context for better understanding Australian media’s attitudes towards China’s soft power. In Australia, the beginning of the Whitlam government marked a historic turning point policy towards China, and the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1972 which “changed the whole momentum of the bilateral relationship”. Since then, more intellectual dialogue and exchanges were implemented through radio, TV, film, and the founding of cultural organisations.

Between 1972-2016, the exchanges between Australia and China experienced tremendous change. Positive increases in trade, tourism, and educational exchange clearly illustrate this evolution. Australian-China relationship reached its top around 2014 due to “the finalisation of the free-trade agreement; official relations were upgraded to comprehensive strategic relations, and a high-level dialogue among top leaders of the two states was established”. However, as the bilateral civil relationship became deeper and more diversified, more differences caused by political systems and social core values appeared, which inevitably led to friction or misunderstandings between individuals and organisations, especially concerning sensitive issues such as human rights and democracy. It can be said that bilateral relations between China and Australia at that time were characterised as a mixture of conflict and collaboration.

The year 2017, especially the final few months, witnessed a downturn of the bilateral relationship between Australia and China. Australia’s ban on using Huawei, China’s telecommunication giant, in its 5G networks for the sake of national security is commonly considered as the starting point of the deteriorating relationship. The ABC programme, Four Corners, entitled Power and Influence: The Hard Edge of China’s Soft Power, sparked a sequence of debates about China’s political interference in Australia. Consequently, the national security concerns, together with the enduring problems such as opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative and South China Sea disputes contributed to the deteriorating relationship, as well as the prevail of the China threat theory.

2.3 Australia media and China soft power

Although there is growing interest in China’s soft power in Australia, the number of academic studies about the Australian media and China’s soft power is small. To date, this small number of academic articles has examined the relationship between the Australian media and China’s soft power and are categorised into two different domains. One explores the important role of the Chinese-language media in Australia as a soft power tool for China. For example, Sun noted that the Chinese-language media can act as a platform for China and Australia to manage their political, strategic and cultural aspects in bilateral relationship. In a separate article, Sun pointed out that Australia and China are competing for influence over Chinese-language digital/social media in order to promote their individual soft power and public diplomacy. Although Sun marginally touched upon the important role of the Chinese-language media as China’s soft power, the focus of this study is to identify opportunities and challenges of the Chinese-language media facing Australian public diplomacy. This lack of emphasis on China’s soft power specifically indicates the inefficiency of literature in exploring Australian media and China’s soft power.

The other domain focuses on the Australian media as a carrier of China’s soft power narratives. Jiang has investigated the Australian media change of narratives on the Belt and Road Initiative through an interview method of research, and the findings reveal that changes in rhetoric have been affected by various reasons such as geopolitics and Australia’s China policy, rather than the BRI project itself. Similarly, in a critical discourse analysis, Sun analysed the Australian media coverage of China’s efforts to contain Covid-19 and found that the Australian media narratives of China’s handling Covid-19 are nothing more than the intensification of a pre-existing China threat theory.

While previous research has provided some insights into Australian media acting either as a soft power tool for China or a conduit of soft power narratives, further investigation is required due to the inadequate research in this area. Therefore, this study aims to expand on the existing literature on this topic.

3 Methods

One of the most basic decisions in news article analysis is selecting the unit of analysis. The units that are commonly used in news article analysis literature include word, word sense, theme, sentence, paragraph, and whole text. The researcher decides which units are appropriate for answering hypotheses and research questions of interest. In this study, theme will be chosen as a unit of analysis in order to obtain the perception of China’s soft power. In addition, samples must be accurate and be comprised of participants who best represent research subjects. In qualitative content analysis, samples such as texts, participants, or documents are usually selected purposefully, and they can assist the researcher to gain a well-informed understanding of the research problem. Therefore, the sample strategy for this research is based on the purposive selection of news articles. Furthermore, this research covers the period between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2019. Furthermore, this research covers the period between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2019. It is significant to note that the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic overshadowed the promotion of China’s soft power and as a consequence its reception in Australia, which should deserve another paper to address this problem.

This research examined ten newspapers; namely, The Australian, The Australian Financial Review, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, The Mercury, Canberra Times, The Advertiser, The Courier-Mail, The West Australian, and Northern Territory News. The study will consider the following criteria when deciding which newspapers would be included in the samples. Initially, the newspapers must boast a large circulation and wide distribution in Australia. In addition, the study will attempt to maintain a balance between national and regional newspapers. The Australian and The Australian Financial Review are the two leading national newspapers, while the other eight are regional newspapers, one from each state and territory. This selection represents geographic diversity. Two main corporations hold newspaper interests in Australia: News Corp Australia and Fairfax Media (Nine Entertainment Co. since 26 July 2018). The newspapers in this study represent a range of coverage and ownership, with five of the newspapers owned by News Corp Australia, four by Fairfax Media, and one by Seven West Media .

This study used the newspaper archive, Factiva, to search and retrieve “Chinese” or “China” and “public diplomacy” news articles from daily newspapers and newswires. Other key terms such as “Chinese” or “China”, and “soft power” or “Chinese” or “China”, and “influence” are also used to search the Factiva newspaper and newswire archives. It is important to use multiple words around a keyword because using too few words can lead to a loss of content based on the keyword. To achieve a holistic interpretation, all types of news articles were considered in this study when searching for themes in relation to China’s soft power and public diplomacy. Wittmer, Klein, Vanderheyden and Garner pointed out that electronic data searches may generate many articles containing the search keywords, even if these keywords are only mentioned casually. Therefore, the following criteria was used to reduce the sample to a relevant and manageable number: the article must have at least two paragraphs; the article must focus on Chinese soft power and public diplomacy; and photographs, infographics, or advertisements will be excluded. As a result, one hundred and six articles have been collected for the thematic analysis.

4 Theme Analysis

Thematic analysis was applied in analysing the collected articles. Thematic analysis approach involves “systematically identifying, organising, and offering insights into patterns of meaning” through coding, and eventually generate themes. In this study, the thematic analysis used is inductive. The inductive approach is usually employed for explaining a phenomenon using the categories to emerge from the data and without applying preconceived categories. The approach is usually suitable when limited theory or research literature is found on a phenomenon. According to Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, if there is not enough or incomplete prior knowledge about a phenomenon, an inductive approach is used. An inductive approach evolves from the specific to the general, so that instances are observed and then integrated into a general statement. As the goal of this study was to discover the collective meanings and patterns behind Australian media articles, a thematic analysis with inductive reasoning was considered the most suitable method to conduct this research dealing with media articles and China’s soft power. This research has followed Braun and Clarke’s six phases of thematic analysis. These include: (1) becoming familiar with data; (2) creating initial codes; (3) exploring themes; (4) reviewing themes; (5) identifying and naming themes; and (6) reporting. As a result of an inductive analysis, four themes have been generated: universities, donations, diasporas and surrounding countries.

4.1 Universities

Regarding China’s influence on Australia, Australian universities are often described in news coverage as important sectors that have been targeted by various organisations and individuals connected with China. The focus on Australian universities in the news coverage did not occur until 2017, and it has sparked heated debate among universities, scholars, and government officials. One group of China watchers highlighted concerns around academic freedom and censorship in universities caused by a series of incidents, including Chinese students’ complaints about offensive teaching materials, and mandarin-language warnings against cheating. The concerns are based on the assumptions that the students who lodged the complaints have connections with or follow the orders of the Chinese government. In addition, the establishment of Confucius Institutes has fuelled more anxiety and suspicion. Since 2006, Australia has established 14 Confucius Institutes and more than 70 Confucius Classrooms. In terms of the number of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms, Australia has ranked the third in the world, just behind the United States and UK. However, the increasing scale and influence of Confucius Institutes caused concerns and heated debates about the interference in academic freedom, and possible undue political influence from China due to the fact that Confucius Institutes are normally established in universities, and its connection with the Chinese government. China and Australia have starkly different views on some controversial issues, so these scholars are concerned that China is using Chinese students and Confucius Institutes to “influence foreign nationals to accept the communist party’s point of view on a plethora of topics”. John Fitzgerald, a professor at Swinburne University, stated that the presence of Confucius Institutes on university campuses is risky because China does not share Australia’s “commitment to liberal values and free and open critical inquiry”. These voices play an important role in pushing the Australian government to take further actions into reviewing issues on freedom of speech and censorship on university campuses.

Despite the calling for more government attention on Chinese government influence in universities, some scholars and politicians hold views that the concerns about censorship and interference in freedom of speech are not based on sufficient evidence. In 2018, in an article from the Financial Review, the Group of Eight universities reported that “concerns raised over Confucius Institutes in other countries have not been raised with them”. In the same vein, after an investigation authorised by the Morrison government on free speech on university campuses, Robert French, former High Court chief justice, concluded that “claims of a freedom of speech crisis on Australian campuses are not substantiated”. Although these concerns were not well grounded, the discussion about China’s influence is connected to a broader debate in Australia about the activities of political influence, including allegations about political donations, all of which the Chinese government denies. 

4.2 Donations

Reports that portray political donations from sources connected to CPC as a threat to Australian politics and institutions accounted for the largest category within this field. One influential figure, Huang Xiangmo, plays a very important role in triggering the Australian media to setting donation as their topic. His name has appeared 88 times among 106 articles. Huang often donated large amount of money to both Labour and Liberals. Due to its role as a leader of the Council for the Peaceful Promotion of the Reunification of China, which is viewed as a “lobbying and influence organisation in Australia”, he was suspected of conducting political influence through donation despite his denials of a link to the Chinese government. These articles attributed words to donations such as “peddling influence”, “opaque campaigns”, and “undermining national interests”. Moreover, in some articles that suggested making donations is not against Australian law, it was still described as ‘‘no comfort’’, and quotes were included indicating Australian scholars’ and politicians’ calls for both a “ban on foreign political donations” and a national integrity commission set up to prevent “flagrantly dodgy practices”. However, in addition to the criticism of donations, a number of articles also expressed the view that politicians need guidance, and politicians should be given advice about distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable donations. Clearly, foreign donations are constantly reported in the media as one of China’s strategies in exerting influence on Australian politics, which has led to a call for a complete ban on foreign donations in Australia.

Despite strong opposition from scholars and politicians against foreign donations, and the subsequent implementation of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme as a measure to deal with this issue, a small number of articles incited concerns by reporting the ban on donations as being prejudiced against Chinese Australians. Michael Spence, Sydney University’s vice-chancellor, warned in the Sydney Morning Herald that “we have to be careful this whole debate doesn’t have overtones of the White Australia Policy”. Peter Drysdale and John Denton described the narrative of China’s influence, including that of “a shadowy cabal of Chinese-born businesspeople… trying to control national policy with cash”, as “an insinuation without foundation”. Furthermore, they argued that people of Chinese origin and China-domiciled businesspeople do make donations to politicians, universities and other Australian institutions, for the same reasons that other people do: to gain prestige, to establish standing, to gain access to certain social circles, or because they feel affinity with the ideas of the politicians or parties they support. Some doubtless hope to influence policy outcomes to advantage, as do donors of all nationalities. This doesn't mean those hopes are realised. Nor can it be assumed that they are acting at the behest of a government agency in Beijing. More importantly, they emphasised that undue influences “should be addressed through Australian legal and political institutions and by our universities” rather than defaming the whole Chinese Australian community. By providing a different lens in viewing these issues, the articles suggested that cautions should be applied to avoid taking the argument to the extreme when addressing the issues caused by political donations to Australian political parties and other organisations.

4.3 Diasporas

Coverage of the Chinese diaspora in these newspaper articles is not undertaken separately in this study; it is interwoven into the topics of universities and foreign donations, among others. Given the important role the Chinese diaspora plays in the overall discussion of foreign influence in Australia, this study must examine the diaspora impact. Members of the Chinese diaspora involved in the foreign influence debate include politicians, businesspeople, scholars, and students. In addition, some activities and organisations conducted by or involved with the Chinese diaspora are also considered as important tools for the foreign-influence activities described in these articles; for example, Chinese-language media and various groups, organisations, and associations, such as the People’s Political Consultative Conference, and China Association for International Friendly Contacts.

With relations deteriorating between China and Australia, political figures with Chinese backgrounds being questioned about possible ties with the Chinese government are covered in these articles. One case in point is Gladys Liu, who was elected as a federal MP in 2019. Because of her involvement in local Chinese community activities supported by the Chinese government, her case has sparked heated debate as to whether it is fair to question Chinese–Australian politicians about their links to the Chinese government. One article pointed out the difficulty in “distinguish[ing] between legitimate security concerns and paranoid—even xenophobic—hysteria” when addressing the issue. The author acknowledged the importance of conducting such a debate, while also warning that “we must be careful about the facts, avoid dangerous generalisations and pay due attention to the complexities of Chinese history and culture”. These articles highlighted Chinese Australian politicians’ difficult situation between engaging with China and being suspected of advancing China’s interests.

Some of the articles include cases involving Chinese diaspora businesspeople. The articles portrayed these businesspeople as “aligned with the Chinese Communist Party”. The allegations against Chinese businesspeople are related to the coexistence of their donations to Australia’s major political parties, universities, and institutes and their connection to the Chinese government. For example, the description in one article suggested that the donations of a prominent businessman might “serve as a vehicle to further Beijing’s aims” despite his denials of a link to the Chinese government. However, in another article, the author argued that “it is simplistic to suggest people with government links are agents of Beijing”. He further explained that, the majority of Chinese businesspeople have ties with the government in one way or another because of the nature of China’s political system, but it does not necessarily mean individual businesspeople are associated with the CPC. This statement suggests that without understanding China’s political reality, some interpretations concerning Chinese businesspeople might be misleading.

Certain news articles have highlighted Chinese students in Australia, describing students’ behaviours in defence of China as guided by or voluntarily following orders from the local consulate offices. Incidents involving Chinese students include their complaints on social media about aggressive teaching materials, using maps of Chinese borders that do not conform to Chinese government’s views, or using Mandarin to warn against plagiarism. Allegations of connections with the CPC are also based on Chinese consular support of the students and student associations. The official response to these issues underwent a shift. The Australian federal government, initially, argued that “universities should deal with the issue individually” and set up their own guidelines, but later changed its attitude by stating that measured actions should be taken.

In conclusion, media outlets were trying to portray Chinese diaspora with connections to Chinese government as a threat to Australia interests, values, and national security. While admitting all diasporas from different nationalities conduct similar activities, the articles regularly pointed out the specialty and difference when they are conducted by Chinese diaspora, citing Australia’s economic dependence on China, or the scale and size of the activities. Even among narratives about different diasporas, the news articles sometimes showed contradictory opinions in their reports. In an article describing the importance of politicians, the author argued that Gladys Liu was not singled out “because she was Chinese but because she is in a powerful position and has ties to the CCP”. However, when it comes to diasporas such as businesspeople and students who are not in powerful positions, different reasons will be provided to convince readers that their cases are serious as well. While most of the articles show predominantly negative opinions in coverage of Chinese diaspora, a small number of articles try to present more balanced views.  Despite their efforts of calling for being careful of racism and for more understanding of the reality of China, these articles are far outnumbered by predominantly critical articles.

4.4 Surrounding Countries

China’s diplomatic and economic engagement with countries neighbouring Australia was prominent in several articles, with the South Pacific Island nations as a focus. China’s public diplomacy was depicted as a challenge to Australia’s influence in these countries. Most of the articles highlighted the challenge in terms such as “strengthen[ing] its support”, “changing the balance of power”, and “expanding strategic ambitions”. In addition, China’s aid diplomacy was also described as “opaque” and “fuell[ing] suspicions about Beijing’s real intent”. These articles argue that China’s presence in the regions is part of a strategy of increasing its influence in the Pacific Islands.

However, several articles claimed that China’s influence in these regions is limited. One article claimed that given the relatively small amount of money China has invested in these regions, Australia’s leading donor position cannot be challenged. The author of this article warned that it is “misguided and potentially counterproductive” to see China as a strategic competitor because it will lead to an ineffective interpretation of the strengths and weaknesses of China’s economic role in the regions; misinterpretation, consequently, will prevent people from having a better assessment of China’s economic activities that are crucial to help moderate China’s ambition.

Despite China having been highlighted as a challenger and geopolitical competitor, articles have pointed out that Australia is not doing enough for its neighbouring nations. This has been explicitly illustrated by former Bougainville Revolutionary Army general Sam Kauona, who noted that “as we move towards independence, we want partners who are interested in helping us build a nation, not just exploit our resources,” and he further claimed that “China has made a proposal and we are still waiting to hear from our Australian and American friends”. Australia’s diminishing levels of aid in the south Pacific has been depicted as “a major strategic blunder”. In 2018, when interviewed by The Australian to comment on China’s aid to Timor-Leste, a former NSW Liberal senator claimed that “Australia had ceded strategic ground to China”. One article then recommended that the best way to respond to China’s economic activities is to “maximise the economic benefits” and “minimise the negative consequences” of China’s role, instead of “speculating on China’s future ambitions” in these regions. Despite the increasing concerns of the risks China might present, these statements, to some extent, indicate the accountability of China’s role in these regions.

5 Framing

One of the most cited definitions about framing is from Entman who defined it as “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the items described”. Framing involves emphasising some parts of a situation in order to focus on a particular understanding of it . Framing theory involves the portrayal of news stories and its impact on how people perceive an issue. It fundamentally includes salience and selection, highlighting some elements of reality and playing down others. This salience and selection of news stories will unavoidably affect an audience’s opinions of a particular event. Framing remains an important approach today, and it is important and relevant to this current research because an understanding of frames helps to clarify many controversies. It also directs attention to the details of how the text of the news article uses its power. In general, framing theory is valuable for enabling the audience to understand “the diversity and fluidity in how issues are conceptualized”.

Three news frames were identified in Australian news coverage of China’s soft power influence. The news stories have been covered from the perspectives of national security threat, democracy challenge, and geopolitical destabiliser. Detailed analysis follows.

5.1 National Security Threat

A frequently recurring frame for Australian media coverage of China’s soft power and public diplomacy is national security threat. The phrase national security appeared 33 times in 106 news stories, five of those in articles published 2010–2016, contrasting with 28 in articles published 2017-2019. The increase in usage of the phrase is not surprising given that the two countries have seen a downturn in relations since 2017.

Articles within the national security threat frame focused on a wide range of topics, including donations, sponsors, trade, investment, academic freedom, and cyberattacks. For example, in his capacity as former federal treasurer, Scott Morrison used national security as a reason to ban China’s biggest state-owned power company from buying a majority stake in New South Wales’s largest power grid, an action which produced discussion in various articles.

In addition to discussing the national security threat in a single field such as trade and donation, most articles explored this framing under the banner of foreign influence or interference. Given that the coverage of individual activity seems not “overly significant”, the focus on the overall impact of China’s soft power activities makes them “appear like a concerted campaign”. By stringing single cases together, the media are presenting a massive and pervasive feature of the China influence. Meanwhile, the coverage of soft power activities across a wide range also shows that China’s influence looms large to Australia’s national security.

The national security threat frame has also been applied to include other countries impacted by Chinese soft power, such as US, Canada, and Southeast Asian nations, and their reactions to it. The articles concerning this topic highlighted four aspects. Firstly, China’s influence does not only exist in Australia, but also in many other countries. Secondly, China’s influence does not only cause harm to the national security of Australia, but also causes harm to many other countries. Thirdly, Australia has been set as an example of countries threatened by China’s influence and how it deals with the influence. Fourthly, China’s influence is so substantial that joint efforts are called for in order to counter it.

Australia has been singled out in the media as the country most influenced by Chinese political interference. Other countries often use Australia as an example when discussing the risk of China’s influence, and looked to Australia for approaches in dealing with the issue. In 2017, soon after the introduction of Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Bill to counter foreign influence, a Canadian senator was reported to “use Australia as a guide” to introduce a bill to broaden restrictions in order to protect Canada’s political sovereignty, and the United States then followed suit. The Australian newspaper reported in June 2018 that the US congress introduced a bill, following Australia’s lead, in dealing with China’s political influence. The frequent reference of Australia as an example in these articles suggested that Australia is taking the lead in counteracting China’s influence.  

In summary, using national security as a frame enables readers to have an impression that China’s foreign influence is sophisticated, all-encompassing, and undeniable.

5.2 Democracy Challenge

Another important feature of the Australian’s use of the threat frame was reflected in the concern that Chinese influence is challenging Australian democracy. This frame was evident in most of the articles and used in the reporting explaining why China’s soft power influence is unwelcome. It stated that the purpose of the soft power initiatives is to impose Chinese political values on Australia. Rory Medcalf, head of the National Security College at the Australian National University, stated in the Australian Financial Review that foreign influence occurring in Australia is not only a national security issue, but it is “a fundamental test of Australian social inclusiveness, cohesion, equity and democracy”. Statements such as this are indicators of ideology-oriented reporting, especially during the time when both countries were facing a deteriorating relationship.

Even if no direct and substantial evidence of China’s interference in Australian democracy exists, many politicians and China watchers with concerns were still covered by the press. In an article from the Australian, the author justified Australia’s ban on Chinese investment by claiming that “without discrimination, it erodes the foundations of freedom”. They further explained that “China may not like the Australian government exercising greater discrimination in foreign investment, but after the sabre-rattling has quieted, it might learn to respect us for it”. This statement hints at Australia’s prejudice against China even though China’s investment in Australia is well below that of many other countries, such as the United States, Britain, and Japan.

Despite the dominant threat frame, several articles counter this narrative by showing a more sympathetic perception in the coverage of China’s soft power and urge Australia to change its mindset in dealing with China. Amid enormous heat in the public debate about China’s influence, some voices of “bring[ing] down the temperature” have been heard in media coverage. Several authors expressed their concern that “if we are not careful, we will run the risk of setting fire to our multicultural harmony”. The Australian newspaper cited John Howard saying the fact that “Australia’s economy, for the first time, is significantly influenced by a country that does not share our political system is no reason to be frightened or to discriminate against Chinese investment”. Drysdale and Denton explained that Chinese politicians, businesspeople, and students do not come to Australia to subvert its democracy. They argued that “the Australian–Chinese community isn’t a dagger pointed at the heart of Australian democracy—it’s a diverse community with every right to participate in the political process”. They also claimed that “it’s an insinuation without foundation” to accuse Chinese businesspeople of using money to affect policymaking. Furthermore, Drysdale and Denton continued to suggest that there is insufficient evidence in blaming Chinese students for interference in academic freedom. On the contrary, most Chinese students come to Australia in order to “buy an Australian educational experience” at the expense of their families.

Australian media used national security and democracy threat as frames in viewing China’s soft power projection. For the Australian public and readers who have insufficient knowledge of China, this framing has been effective in influencing their opinion on China. The increasingly negative perceptions of China in reports from the Lowy Institute over the past few years are good examples of the media’s influence on the public because, for most Australians, media is the only important source they can access for information about China.

5.3 Geopolitical Destabiliser

China’s global expansion of influence was often understood and interpreted in the context of a geostrategic destabiliser frame. China’s soft power efforts are often described as a challenge to Australia and its neighbouring countries such as Pacific nations, New Zealand, Southeast Asia, and India, as well as to faraway allies including the US, Canada, and Britain. This perception of “challenge” was not always based on individual soft power activities, but on China’s overall foreign policy.

China’s increasing presence in the Pacific region was covered in the framework of its expanding strategic ambitions. Australia is aware that China, along with other countries and regions, is competing for the hearts and minds of South Pacific Island countries through trade, aid, economic, and cultural activities, which have been increasing in the region. For example, in a 2013 Australian Defence White Paper draft, it was noted that “Australia’s contribution to this region may be balanced in the future by the support and assistance provided by other regional powers”. It is evident that this statement was aimed at China, because it had become the third largest donor in the region after Australia and US at that time. The statement also implied that competition in influence has made a great impact, as Jonathan Pryke, former Director of the Lowy Institute’s Pacific Islands Program, pointed out that “the Pacific has largely enjoyed a benign status on the geopolitical stage. This has all changed with China’s growing presence in the region”. By viewing China’s public diplomacy activities as efforts to change the status quo of the region, Australian media implies that China has become a destabiliser and its increasing soft power activities might have impacted the role Australia has traditionally played in this region.

China’s global expansion of influence in many regions has been depicted as “assertive”, which caused concerns that China is aiming to change the international order. In terms of the South China Sea dispute, one article viewed it as having “obvious consequences for Australian trade” if military conflict occurs, because Australia relies on this region for oil, gas, and shipping. More importantly, Australia might get caught in a broader geopolitical conflict between China and the US.  Admiral Harris, a former US envoy to Australia, argued that China’s claims in the East and South China Seas were “co-ordinated, methodical and strategic, using their military and economic power to erode the free and open international order”. The perceived assertiveness of China in dealing with international territorial disputes is often used as evidence by Australian media to doubt China’s soft power efforts, because they think that China’s behaviour is not consistent with what it promised in its soft power objectives, such as win-win principles and building a harmonious world. Therefore, China’s soft power efforts are often described as counterproductive in Australian media when Chinese foreign policies are considered not to align with its stated soft power policies.

The most prominent geopolitical frame is reflected in Australia’s difficult position between China, its largest trading partner, and the US, its security ally. It is public knowledge that Australia’s relationship with China is directly influenced by the China–US relationship. Australian media’s attitudes regarding China’s soft power influence are greatly influenced by the country’s relationship with China and the US, China’s relationship with the US, and how the US views China’s projections of soft power. Australia is often considered to be in a “stuck position” between China and US. A few examples can illustrate this: in an article from The Sydney Morning Herald, Uhlmann stated that “for the first time our major trading partner is not a liberal democracy, and it is a strategic rival of our key ally”. This statement presents the dilemma facing Australia, highlighting unfamiliarity in dealing with China, and difficulty in walking a tightrope between China and the United States. In 2011, an article in The Australian about Beijing’s influence in the Pacific highlighted Hillary Clinton’s warning the Gillard administration that the “US was in a competition with China in the Pacific”, while on the other hand emphasising that the Gillard government “makes no mention of China’s influence” when talking about Australia’s interests in these regions in a then newly released National Security Strategy. Seven years later, from the same media outlet, an article talking about the US’s assessment of China’s influence pointed to “Beijing’s sustained efforts to build power and influence in Asia at America’s expense”. The author further pointed out that, in response to the assessment, the Turnbull administration “shares many of these concerns, but it has been more muted in its language, for fear of angering Beijing”. These examples reveal how Australia is caught in the middle of the strategic competition between China and the United States. Meanwhile, these two examples show that Australian media plays a prominent role in pushing successive Australian governments to take concrete measures in order to counter Chinese influence, via narratives implying that Australian governments were afraid of angering China due to the substantial economic benefits the relationship brings Australia.

6 Implications

In Australian media, despite a small number of articles defending against the China threat views, China’s soft power activities are predominantly portrayed through the lens of influence, specifically as challenges and threats. These unique perspectives entailed Australian media focusing on concerns caused by China’s soft power, rather than on the benefits. Australia’s concerns are directly linked to a certain group of Chinese communities, including politicians, businesspeople, scholars, and students, due to their possible close connections with the CPC. These groups are often suspected of engaging in soft power activities to advance China’s interests at the expense of Australia’s national interests, which has led to widespread calls for action taken to counter China’s influence in Australia. As a result, the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme was released in 2018, which greatly contributed to a further deteriorating relationship between China and Australia.  

Analysis of the chosen newspaper articles identified four themes and three frames of China’s soft power and public diplomacy in Australia media. The themes include universities, donations, diaspora, and neighbouring countries. Accordingly, the three frames are characterised by national security threat, democracy challenge and geopolitical destabiliser. These findings have significant implications for understanding Australia’s media perceptions of China’s soft power and public diplomacy. Firstly, the Australia-China relationship plays a significant role in Australia media’s perceptions of China and its soft power. As an example, Australia’s concerns regarding China’s political and economic influence are often reflected in media coverage with negative attitudes. This finding corroborates the ideas of Jiang, who suggested that China’s BRI project itself is not the driving force behind the media narratives about it, but rather it is affected by other factors such as global politics and Australian policy towards China. In this way, as international politics have become more complicated, the Australia–China relationship has deteriorated, and Australia has leaned away from China in the name of national and democratic security. It is evident more negative perceptions have been produced than positive ones in Australian media. Secondly, Australia media often views China’s soft power as a challenge, and even a threat. This can be easily seen from the framing the media chose to report on China’s soft power. The negative aspects, such as political donations and interference in academic freedom were highlighted, while positive aspects such as cultural exchanges and promotions, research collaboration, and trade and economic cooperation were largely neglected and unreported. This is consistent with that of Sun who also found that Australian media framed China as a threat, using either “political and ideological” terms” or “conspiratorial, racist, and Sino-phobic” terms in its coverage of China’s efforts in containing Covid-19. Thirdly, Australian media’s perceptions of China’s soft power are directly linked to the geopolitical context, especially China-US relations. For example, the Morrison government’s closeness to the Trump administration resulted in stronger criticism of China’s influence when the China-US relationship was in freefall. Fourthly, Australian media’s perceptions of China’s soft power are also connected to China’s domestic affairs, as well as its other foreign policies. For example, China’s policies about the South China Sea and Pacific Island nations also shaped how Australia views China’s soft power efforts.

7 Conclusion

Despite the predominantly negative reportage, Australia-China relationship has always been characterized with stronger economic ties than political, strategic and cultural connections. However, as the economic connection became stronger with China, it was natural for Australia to have more cooperation in other aspects, such as culture, research, and technology. The closeness resulted in Australia becoming sensitive to China’s politics and social policies, which has led to rising concerns about China’s operations in its soft power projection, without realizing that, in China, “economics and politics are not separated”. The increase in concerns reflected Australia’s intention to continue to engage with China because these concerns can be easily removed if Australia decided to disengage with China, which, noticeably, was not Australia’s choice. As Grigg and Riordan noted, “If China was just the enemy then it would be pretty simple. But that’s not the case as we have benefited hugely from China’s rise”. Australian media outlets are characterised by mixed sentiments of engagement with China but at the same time concern over its undue influence.

Based on the results of this research, a number of suggestions can be made to Australian policymakers and media practitioners, as well as China’s soft power policymakers and practitioners. First, since Australian media perceptions of China’s soft power are closely related to geopolitical, ideological, and cultural factors, the Australian government should take them into account when developing policy towards China, understanding media views about China’s soft power does not correctly reflect the reality of China’s soft power projection. At the same time, China should also be aware of the various factors that could affect Australian media perceptions of its soft power and try to manage its soft power and diplomatic activities to avoid any unnecessary and unintentional influence.

Second, it has been pointed out that Australian anxieties and fear of China are caused “partly by China’s growing power and influence, and partly by Australian elites’ lack of knowledge about a rapidly modernising China”. In Australia, there is only a small number of China experts. Although many claimed that they have some understanding of China, their knowledge is “still far too simplistic and fanciful, and of little use for devising effective policies rather than spreading fear and Sinophobia”. Therefore, in order to improve media objectivity and reduce the misperceptions, Australia needs to enhance media literacy about China.

Third, while China has made some achievements in soft power and public diplomacy initiatives, it still faces challenges when communicating its perspective to Australia. The lack of effective communication can cause misunderstandings between the two countries and consequently worsen an already intense relationship. Cultural, historical and political differences have been contributed to China’s inadequate communication strategy. For example, Wang pointed out that “most of [sic] China's public diplomacy agencies do not have in-depth and accurate knowledge of their targeted groups” when conducting diplomatic activities. Therefore, to build mutual trust and minimize misperceptions, it is critical for China to improve its communication capability by expressing its ideas in a way that can be easily understood by Australian people.

References

[1] Bjola, C., & Jiang, L. (2015). Social media and public diplomacy. Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice, 71-88.

[2] Cooper, V. A. (2019). Ideologies and practices of public diplomacy media outlets : a critical discourse analysis of China RadioInternational and Voice of America.

[3] Dardis, F. E. (2007). The Role of Issue-Framing Functions in Affecting Beliefs and Opinions about a Sociopolitical Issue.Communication Quarterly, 55(2), 247-265. doi:10.1080/01463370701290525

[4] El Damanhoury, K., & Garud-Paktar, N. (2021). Soft Power Journalism: A Visual Framing Analysis of COVID-19 on Xinhua and VOA’s Instagram Pages. Digital Journalism, 10(9), 1-23.

[5] Gao, J., Ingram, C., & Kee, P. (2016). Global Media and Public Diplomacy in Sino-Western Relations [1 online resource (219 pages)]. Retrieved from https://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=4605449

[6] Lim, J., & Seo, H. (2009). Frame Flow between Government and the News Media and its Effects on the Public: Framing of North Korea. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 21(2), 204-223. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edp011

[7] Mano, W. (2021). Geopolitics of China's Rising Media and Soft Power in Africa: Eating and Being Eaten. Communicatio, 47(3), 1-25. doi:10.1080/02500167.2021.2001554

[8] Pan, C., Isakhan, B., & Nwokora, Z. (2020). Othering as soft-power discursive practice: China Daily’s construction of Trump’s America in the 2016 presidential election. Politics, 40(1), 54-69. doi:10.1177/0263395719843219

[9] Sevin, E. (2018). Public Diplomacy on Social Media: Analyzing Networks and Content.

[10] Wright, K., Scott, M., & Bunce, M. (2020). Soft power, hard news: how journalists at state-funded transnational media legitimize their work. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 25(4), 607-631.

[11] Yang, Y. (2020). Looking inward: How does Chinese public diplomacy work at home? The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 22(3), 369-386. doi:10.1177/1369148120917583

[12] Zehui Dai, W. J. (2018). A Qualitative Content Analysis of the Two-Child Policy on Chinese News Media.