INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the balance of power among major countries has been constantly changing, and for the first-time world power has begun to tilt to the non-Western countries. As a large number of emerging economies and developing countries are rising in groups, the world economic centre gradually shifts to the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. The global landscape in which Western countries dominated international politics over the past century is undergoing fundamental changes, and the development or changes of the international pattern in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions have increasingly prominent impacts all over the world.

China, Japan, the US, Australia, and India are countries that play important roles in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. After World War II, the relationship between Australia and Japan began to recover and has developed rapidly in the field of politics, economy, and culture, which has a critical influence on the overall situation in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Australia is a middle power with great impact in the South Pacific region, while Japan is a highly developed economy located in Northeast Asia, actively seeking more international political power.

In the context of China’s peaceful development, the US regards China as its biggest strategic rival. In order to constrain China’s development on a larger scale and try to maintain the international order and regional order led by the US, the term “Indo-Pacific” has thus become one of the core concepts of US diplomacy, defence, and security strategy after Donald Trump took US presidency in 2017.

Australia and Japan are not only the two important allies of the US, but also the northern and southern axes of the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”. Therefore, they are the key factors in the shaping of the “Indo-Pacific” construct. China should also take them into consideration especially in the diplomacy and peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In recent years, Chinese academics have paid greater attention to the study of Australia’s foreign relations. According to the characteristics of Australia-Japan relations in different periods, researches can be roughly divided into three stages.

The first stage focuses on the relationship between Australia and Japan before WWII. Generally speaking, there are only a limited number of studies on Australia-Japan relations before WWII in China, which can mainly be found in Zhang’s A Study of the Relationship between Australia and Asia (1940-1995) and Wang’s A History of Australia’s Foreign Relations in the 20th Century. The studies on this aspect mainly lay emphasis on the development of Australia-Japan relations in terms of immigration and trade.

The second stage is about the study of Australia-Japan relations from WWII to the end of the Cold War. During this period, Australia and Japan signed The Commerce Agreement between Australia and Japan in 1957 and The Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1976 respectively. Scholars have great interest in these two agreements, and they try to explore their historical background and impacts on the bilateral economic and trade relations between Australia and Japan.

The third stage pays attention to the Australia-Japan relations after the end of the Cold War. Since Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was signed in March 2007, there have been more researches on the relationship between Australia and Japan in terms of their alliance and cooperation on security, such as Zhang’s The Reason and Influence about Japan and Australia Alliance Trend from the Perspective of Alliance, Wang’s Australia-Japan Relations: from a Constructive Partnership to a Quasi-Alliance, and Wang’s The Analysis of new Japan’s security strategy from the perspective of Australia and Japan’s Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, etc.

It is therefore a fact that studies on the contemporary Australia-Japan relations, especially studies focusing on the development of Australia-Japan relations under the background of the US “Indo-Pacific Strategy” are scarce. In terms of geopolitics, there are also few studies on the impact of the development of Australia-Japan relations on China in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean regions.

This study attempts to analyse the current development of Australia-Japan relationship from the perspective of the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, especially focusing on the China factors in the Australia-Japan relations and its impact on China.

THE “INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY”: ORIGIN AND CONTENT

President Trump repeatedly emphasized the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” during his trip to Asia in November 2017, which attracted much attention around the world. However, “Indo-Pacific” as a construct is not first proposed by the Trump administration. It was put forward as early as the Obama administration. However, during the Obama administration in which the Asia Pacific Rebalancing Strategy was the key part of US diplomacy in Asia, although the strategic value of the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean had already been recognised, it wasn’t attached too much importance (Gu, 2020). Hillary Clinton, then the US Secretary of State, is considered to be the first person to use the construct of “Indo-Pacific” among the senior officers in the US government. Her article America’s Pacific Century published in October 2011emphasized the growing connectivity between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and pointed out that the alliance between the US and Australia would expand from the Pacific Partnership to the Indo-Pacific Partnership (Clinton,2020). In addition, during Obama’s second term, US government officials frequently put forward the concept of the “Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor”. Therefore, the US “Indo-Pacific Strategy” is not an invention of the Trump administration.

Internationally, the construct of “Indo-Pacific” and the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” have gone through a relatively long process before they were attached great importance.

The “Indo-Pacific” has long existed as a marine biogeographic concept, covering a wide range of fields. As a geographical construct, the “Indo-Pacific” has the characteristics of geo-economics, geopolitics, and geostrategy. In terms of geo-economics, the “Indo-Pacific” construct emphasizes the rapid economic development of Asia, especially that of China and India. The prosperous maritime trade led by these two countries on the Pacific and Indian Oceans is of great significance for these regions and the global economy. Economic factors are the basis for the rise of the concept of “Indo-Pacific”, which later came into the dimensions of geopolitics and geostrategy. In terms of geopolitics, “Indo-Pacific” actually refers to the expanded Asia-Pacific which now includes the Indian Ocean and India, previously uncovered in the concept of Asia-Pacific. In terms of the geostrategy, “Indo-Pacific” has turned into a strategic system, which means linking the western Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean as a single entity and regarding it as a strategic arc. And then, “Indo-Pacific” is upgraded into a strategy rather than just a construct. More importantly, it is only at the level of strategic planning does the “Indo-Pacific” construct have the existence value (Zhao, 2013).

The “Indo-Pacific Strategy” has been put forward, implemented and promoted with the slogan of “America First”. Meanwhile, India is an important part of this strategy, and Australia and Japan also play pivotal roles in it.

So far, Australia has used the concept of “Indo-Pacific” most actively, systematically and comprehensively among all relevant countries (Zhou, 2018). Australia is surrounded by the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Therefore, it is more sensitive to the geopolitical significance of the “Indo-Pacific”. In the 1960s and 1970s, Australian scholars put forward the concept of “Indo-Pacific” from the perspective of international security and strategy, for the reason that they believed maintaining a strategic balance between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific would help ensure Australia’s national security. In the 21st century, this intention was expressly manifested in its government text, Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper. In this White Paper, Australia officially defines the region where it locates as the Indo-Pacific. In general, Australia is very active in promoting the international use, institutionalization and operationalization of the “Indo-Pacific”. The “Indo-Pacific” has also replaced the Asia-Pacific as Australia’s main regional conceptual framework when it deals with international issues.

Similarly, Japan has long been concerned about the concept of the “Indo-Pacific”. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may be the first state leader to officially mention both the Indian Ocean and Pacific in official documents. As early as 2006, Abe put forward the idea of treating the Indian Ocean and Pacific as a strategic entity. Then in 2007, Abe visited India and delivered a speech titled “Confluence of the Two Seas” at the Indian Parliament. After Abe came back to power in 2012, he launched a new round of “Indo-Pacific” promotion, envisaging Australia, India, Japan, and Hawaii of the US to form an “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond” (Zhang, 2018). At the same time, Japan also continued to strengthen bilateral relations with Australia and other countries in order to implement this strategy.

In general, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” is a “containment strategy” constructed by countries such as Australia, Japan and India under the leadership of the US to target at China’s development. This “containment strategy” is conducive to cultivating alliance relations and establishing a multi-level network with US’s strategic allies and partners to prevent the emergence of a country whose national strength is as powerful as the US in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean regions. Moreover, it also treats the Pacific and Indian Ocean as a unified strategic unit to reconstruct the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific with the dominance of American hegemony. In fact, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” put forward by the Trump administration in 2017 and the measures it has carried out since 2018 are also responses to China’s the Belt and Road Initiative (Zhu, 2018).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIA-JAPAN RELATIONS UNDER THE “INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY”

4.1 The Development of Australia-Japan Relations before the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and the US’s Impact on It

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Commonwealth of Australia was confederated, while Japan, whose strategy of militaristic expansion gradually took shape, began to rise. The relations between Australia and Japan at this time were mainly intertwined in racial discrimination, immigration policy, economy and trade, and national defence and security. Australia considered Japan as a threat in the north, but due to its fear of Japan’s power, close economic and trade relations with this Asian country, and its compliance with the foreign policy of the UK, Australia adopted a policy of appeasement towards Japan. The outbreak of the Pacific War during which time Japan bombed the Australian city of Darwin indicated the total failure of Australia’s appeasement policy, thereby bringing Australia-Japan relations a standstill.

Because of the historical grudges between Australia and Japan, and Australia’s concern about the resurgence of Japanese militarism, although the nongovernment trade between them had been restored in 1947, Australia still adopted a serious discriminatory policy towards Japanese investment before the mid-1950s. After WWII, with the development of the increasingly closer Australia-US relations and Japan-US relations, and the need for economic recovery and development both in Australia and Japan, these two countries expanded their economic and trade cooperation under the auspices of the US, and signed the Commerce Agreement between Australia in 1957. Since then, the economy and trade between the two countries had developed rapidly. In 1966, Japan became Australia’s largest export market.

With the impact of economic and trade cooperation, the political ice between Australia and Japan gradually began to thaw, laying a sound foundation for the improvement and development of bilateral relations. In 1976, Australia and Japan signed the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which involved mutually beneficial cooperation in economy, trade and energy. This treaty established a framework for the sustained, stable and healthy development of bilateral relations and provided a basis for further development of the political relations.

After the continuous cooperation in the field of economy and trade in the 1950s and 1960s and the substantial political exchanges in the 1970s, Japan-Australia bilateral relations began to normalise. In the 1980s, the two countries actively conducted regional cooperation, closely coordinated in the construction of the Economic Zones in the Pacific Rim, and played an important role in promoting the establishment of the APEC.

In the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, the global structure developed towards multipolarity. Both Australia and Japan hoped to gain benefits from economic cooperation and diplomatic interaction in the Asia-Pacific region. As two important allies of the US in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia and Japan rely on each other to achieve their respective strategic interests. In May 1995, they signed the Joint Declaration to “build an enduring and steadfast partnership” (paras. 10). Since then, Australia-Japan relationship had moved onto a new level.

In the 21st century, Japan-Australia relationship has continued to move forward steadily in the field of economy and politics. Meanwhile, the security cooperation has also been developed, and a strategic alliance has become increasingly evident. Additionally, the importance of the US in the Australia-Japan relationship is more prominent. Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell met with Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer during his visit to Australia in August 2001. He proposed the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), which received positive responses from Australia and Japan. The prototype of the US-Australia-Japan trilateral alliance began to take shape. The TSD was originally convened at the senior official level in 2002, then was upgraded to the ministerial level in 2005. To implement the close cooperation between the two sides on security, Australia and Japan followed the US in fighting against terrorism and nuclear proliferation. In March 2007, the two countries signed the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, and also reached an agreement on the establishment of Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (2+2). Australia-Japan relationship has moved towards a quasi-alliance.

Therefore, in more than one century from the beginning of the 20th century to 2007, Australia-Japan relationship has transformed from hostility to “a constructive partnership” and then to a “quasi-alliance”, with progressive cooperation in economy, politics, military and national defence. The US has influenced the Australia-Japan relationship greatly, urging it to transform from bilateral relations to multilateral platforms. After 2007, with the continuous development of China and the strategic adjustment of the US, the Japan-Australia relationship is faced with new changes, and it actually become a critical instrument under the US “Indo-Pacific Strategy”.

4.2 The Development of Australia-Japan Relationship under the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and China’s Impact on It

1) Economy and Trade

The Obama administration proposed the “Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy”, which was an important measure for the US to return to the Asia-Pacific, and an important economic component of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). The agreement was signed by Brunei, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand in 2005 at first. Then the US joined the discussion in 2008, followed by Japan and Australia. The TPP intended to exclude China, a critical economic engine, out of this Asia-Pacific economic cooperation structure. However, the Global Financial Crisis triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis in the US was severely affecting Western economies, while China was bucking the trend with its economy growing strongly. In 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy. This fact surprised Australia and Japan, with some people in the two countries worrying that China’s rapid economic development would result in changes of the overall order of the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, Australia and Japan were delighted to see this new free trade system with exclusiveness led by the US, and hoped to obtain greater benefits from it.

Australia and Japan are actively seeking bilateral economic cooperation. In 2002, Australia indicated its intent to negotiate for a free trade agreement with Japan, but it was rejected by the latter because Japan was very sensitive to its highly protected agricultural sector. In 2014, the former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott signed the Economic Partnership Agreement with the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Australia is the first agricultural product exporter to reach a trade agreement with Japan. After the agreement was signed, Japanese manufactured products enjoy lower tariffs, while Australian beef, dairy products, grain, energy and mineral products and other goods have much better access to the Japanese market.

The change of Japan’s attitude towards the free trade agreement with Australia has been influenced by the China factor. The economic and trade relationship between Australia and Japan is obviously complementary. For instance, Japan imports food, minerals, energy and other resources from Australia, while Australia imports industrial products from Japan. The fact that Australia and Japan are interdependent of each other not only in the geographical location, but also in the field of economy and trade, makes Japan once become Australia’s largest trading partner. However, this situation changed at the beginning of the 21st century when China joined the WTO. At that time, China’s industrial economy continued to develop, and there was an urgent need for minerals and energy. Therefore, Australia became China’s ideal trading partner. The development of China-Australia trade put Japan in a position of stressed competition. In addition, another direct factor is that China and Australia initiated negotiations on a free trade agreement in 2005, placing greater pressure on Japan. Japan had to adjust its original economic and trade policies with Australia, and strived to reach a free trade agreement with it before China to secure its imports of mineral and energy resources and the competitiveness of its export commodities in the Australian market.

As early as 2007, China surpassed Japan to become Australia’s largest trading partner for the first time, and to date has maintained this position. However, in recent years, in order to reduce the so-called over-dependence on the Chinese market and diversify its economy and trade, Australia has strengthened its economic cooperation with Japan once again.

In 2017, after Trump took office as the US President, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, which had already been brewing during the Obama administration, became the US’s official course of strategic action. However, Trump continues to emphasize national interests in diplomacy with his “America First” doctrine, even withdrawing from the TPP, showing a strong sense of pragmatism (Zhou, 2018). As a result, Australia and Japan have to depend on their own and adjust their economic strategies. The two countries unanimously decided to continue to promote TPP even after the US had withdrawn. With the joint efforts of Japan and Australia, the member states of the TPP except the US, signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) in March 2018, further strengthening the momentum of regionalization and grouping of global economy and trade. In July 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the US would provide US$130 million in investment to countries in the “Indo-Pacific” region for new technologies, energy and infrastructure construction. Although this move seems to show that the US is still interested in stimulating the regional economy in the “Indo-Pacific”, its essential purpose is to confront and compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In fact, the US-led “Indo-Pacific Strategy” advocates bilateral trade agreements on a reciprocal basis, while the CPTPP seeks the development of regional trade. In addition, the US intends to contain China’ economic power and influence in the “Indo-Pacific” region, but Australia and Japan have repeatedly expressed their welcome to China to join the CPTPP.

Therefore, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” has become the glue of Australia-Japan relationship in terms of economy and trade. Although both Australia and Japan are suspicious of China’s economic development, and are willing to follow the US, it cannot be denied that they pay more attention to their own economic interests. As the leaders of CPTPP, Australia and Japan intend to use CPTPP to expand the economic and trade cooperation in the Asia-Pacific to the “Indo-Pacific” region, and they are also willing to accept China’s participation in CPTPP, which is in conflict with the US’ “India Pacific Strategy”.

2) Politics and diplomacy

According to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America issued by the White House in 2017, the political connotation of the “India Pacific Strategy” is that the US will redouble its commitment to established alliances and partnerships, and build the vision for the “Indo-Pacific” with common values (pp.46-47). As mentioned above, at the beginning of the 21st century, Australia, Japan, and the US upgraded their trilateral dialogue. On 7 August 2017, the seventh “Trilateral Strategic Dialogue” ministerial meeting was held, whose ministers reaffirmed the importance of the trilateral strategic partnership to ensure a free, open, peaceful, stable, democratic, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, based on the rule of law.

Since 2017, Japan has actively promoted the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”, and the build-up of high-quality infrastructure has been an important part of Japan’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy”. In August 2018, during the US-Australia-Japan Ministerial Strategic Dialogue in Singapore, all parties agreed and started to promote the construction of high-quality infrastructure in the “Indo-Pacific” region, which intends to challenge the interconnectivity of infrastructure promoted by China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and to form strategic competition in aid and investment in that region.

Apart from the trilateral alliance among Australia, Japan and the US, the strategic cooperation among the US, Japan, Australia and India is also active in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean in recent years. As early as May 2007, the four countries had a strategic dialogue in Manila first, and then held a joint military manoeuvre. In fact, the strategic dialogue among the four countries did not proceed smoothly. Its apparent intention to contain China was strongly opposed by China, which made its member states more cautious, bringing this quadrilateral dialogue to a temporary end. But in recent years, under the leadership of the US “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, the quadrilateral dialogue was restarted in 2017, and the strategic cooperation framework of the US, Japan, Australia and India has been further implemented and promoted.

Under the trilateral alliance and the quadrilateral cooperation framework, the political relations between Australia and Japan have been continuously strengthened, and political consensus has been deepened on the basis of the “quasi-alliance” relationship since 2007. Japan regards Australia as an important support for its so-called “Democratic Security Diamond” strategy. Australia also claims that Japan is Australia’s “best friend” and “strong ally” in Asia. In addition, on the issue related to the Korean Peninsula, the Diaoyu Islands dispute, and Japan’s historical outlooks, Australia has shown a clear tendency to lean towards Japan (Qu, 2014). During the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, Australia followed the US’ blame game to make accusations of China. Furthermore, it proposed to conduct a so-called “independent inquiry” of China, to which Japan gave its support to.

All in all, the US “Indo-Pacific Strategy” has been supported and promoted by Japan and Australia. For one thing, Japan and Australia show strategic anxiety about China’s rise, intending to take advantage of this strategy to prevent the US from withdrawing from this region. For the other, the US, which has abandoned its “Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy”, also needs a fresh alternative. Therefore, in politics and diplomacy, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” has become a protective umbrella over Australia and Japan held by the US. Affected by this strategy, the development of bilateral relations between Australia and Japan has clearly shown political intentions to contain China, trying to maintain the international rules and regional order dominated by the West.

3) Security and Defence

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has prompted itself to further integrate into the trend of globalization, which has incurred unwarranted suspicions in countries such as the US, Australia, Japan, which claim that China’s growing power will affect the regional security. At the instigation of the US, the South China Sea dispute has persisted, rendering it not only a security flashpoint in the “Indo-Pacific”, but also a focus of attention of Australia and Japan. For Australia, the South China Sea is an important transport corridor connecting Australia with other Asian countries for maritime trade. In 2015, the then Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop stated that two-thirds of Australia’s trade went through the South China Sea. For Japan, a country with limited resources, with the need to import oil from the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the South China sea is its maritime “lifeblood” as all of Japan’s oil transportation has to go through this sea route. Moreover, in order to maintain and expand their influence in the Southeast Asia, Japan and Australia hype up the “China threat theory” especially on the South China Sea issue, and try to provokes confrontations between ASEAN countries and China.

In the background of the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, the US continues to carry out military ventures under the framework of the “Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy”, such as strengthening frontline forces and adjusting military deployment, so as to ensure the exchanges and integration between the US and its allies as well as partners, and to enhance security cooperation. Australia and Japan, as the two important allies of the US, have participated in the naval exercise with the US since 2007. At first, the three countries conducted joint military exercises only in the western waters of Kyushu and the coastal waters of Okinawa. However, in 2011, they held the first military drill near the South China Sea, and did it again in 2016. In 2019, they had another manoeuvre around the South China Sea. Although the US, Japan and Australia all claimed that the exercises were not aimed at China, obviously they had hidden agenda which contradicted their rhetoric.

Since 2017, on the grounds of maintaining the so-called “freedom of navigation”, US warships have frequently sailed through the South China Sea, even into 12 nautical miles of the Chinese islands and sea features, seriously threatening China’s national sovereignty and security. As allies of the US, sometimes Australia and Japan also join the navigation. What’s more, they even accuse China of militarising the South China Sea when China builds defence facilities on its own islands and reefs. In addition, the US frequently provokes China on the Taiwan issue. For example, on 9 June 2020, a US Navy transport jet was sighted flying directly over Taiwan in the morning and was last spotted flying towards the South China Sea. It is worth noting that this jet took off from Okinawa Prefecture, Japan.

Although the US is still the largest power in the world, the US’s deployment and operations in the Middle East in the past 20 years have, to a certain extent, greatly consumed the strength of its military, and its combat readiness is not sufficient enough to support the potential conflicts with other major powers. A substantial reduction in military expenditure during recent years can also reflect the decline in the strength of this superpower (Xiao, 2020). In terms of security, Trump always stresses his “America first” doctrine, which has forced Australia and Japan to be in deep anxiety of whether the decline in US military presence and military strength will have a negative impact on their own security. Therefore, no matter under the former “Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy” or the current “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, Australia and Japan try to actively deepen their bilateral security and defence cooperation based on the framework of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. The Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed in 2007 established the guiding principles and basic framework for Australia-Japan security and defence cooperation. After that, Australia and Japan reached a number of other bilateral security and defence agreements, such as Strategy for Cooperation in the Pacific, to strengthen their collaboration on personnel exchanges, intelligence sharing, reciprocal provision of supplies and services in the field of logistics support, aid of weapons and maintenance of sea order. In addition, the leaders of Japan and Australia have interacted frequently and designed top-level security cooperation with a conducive external environment. For example, the then Japanese Prime Minister Abe visited Australia in 2017 and emphasized that Japan and Australia should further deepen defence cooperation in areas such as joint training and exercises. In 2018, the former Australian Prime Minister Turnbull visited Japan and inspected a Japanese Self-Defence Force (SDF) base near Tokyo with Abe, and further promoted the signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Under the “2+2” mechanism, Japan and Australia can coordinate their security policies together, plan their way of cooperation, keep dealing with regional security affairs in the “Indo-Pacific”, and finally realize the framework of regional multilateral security cooperation.

The US is also happy to see the bilateral cooperation between Australia and Japan in security and defence. With Australia and Japan as its northern and southern axes, their closer cooperation can help US maintain its current position in East Asia and exert more pressure on China.

Under the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, Australia and Japan continue to deepen maritime security cooperation in the “Indo-Pacific”, which not only accords with the US’ interests but is also based on their own security interests. All the actions or declarations of the Quad involving the US, Japan, Australia and India, the trilateral alliance involving the US, Japan and Australia, and bilateral strategic and cooperative partners of Australia and Japan touch on issues such as maritime order and freedom of navigation, which form a semi-encircled structure girdling China, which has a great impact on China’s neighbouring maritime safety, and undoubtedly hinder the development of China’s “Maritime Silk Road”.

CONCLUSIONS

Out of the mutual suspicion and cautiousness towards China, Australia and Japan, which were once hostile to each other in WWII, become allies under US “Indo-Pacific Strategy”. First, Japan is Australia’s second largest trading partner and third largest source of investment. The bilateral economic and trade connection between them is very profound. Second, Australia and Japan, as allies of the US, share the same political systems and values, and thus the bilateral political and diplomatic connection is intimate. With the birth of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and the signing of many bilateral agreements related to security and defence, their bilateral security and defence cooperation is solid. The goal of strengthening Australia-Japan relationship and their deepening cooperation is obviously to contain China’s peaceful development. As Australia and Japan are two “axes” in the “Indo-Pacific”, the development of contemporary Australia-Japan relationship under the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” is more of a “tool” of the US to contain and combat China than serving the national interest of both countries.

However, despite the consistent goal of the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, there are still flaws and limitations in the development of relations between Australia and Japan. First, the historical issues of the two countries can be the inducement to instability. Although the two countries are currently in good relations, the estrangement brought about by the Pacific War still exists. For example, when the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was first published, it raised doubts in the Australia society. Therefore, whether the two countries can really put aside historical issues and achieve true strategic mutual trust is still uncertain. Second, their strategic assessment of China is also different. There is no direct security conflict or territorial dispute between Australia and China. Instead, Australia gains huge benefits in its economic relations with China. Therefore, Australia’s China policy is largely based on its Western political attributes and values. Even as Australia has some suspicions about China, in general, China is still an important opportunity for its development. Meanwhile, between China and Japan there are historical grievances and complicated nationalist sentiments. The two countries geographic proximity makes Japan regard China’s development as a potential threat. China has effectively replaced Japan’s position as the most powerful country in Asia, creating competitive pressure on Japan. As a result, Tokyo attaches great importance to the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, which can isolate China politically, contain the Belt and Road Initiative and expand Japan’s economic influence in the “Indo-Pacific”. More importantly, it can consume China’s diplomatic and military resources so that Japan can gain an advantage in the East China Sea over China.

However, after Australia and Japan have joined the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” led by the US, and connected their own development with this anti-China chariot, they need to think carefully whether the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” produces benefits without any harm.

For Japan, in recent years, with the support and “permissiveness” from the US, it has taken substantial steps to amend the Constitution of Japan to formalize the legal status of the Self-Defence Forces. However, in order to achieve this goal thoroughly, is it necessary for Japan to join the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and confront China? Politically, China is a permanent member of the United Nations’ Security Council, which has influence over Japan on its intent to participate in international affairs and elevate its international status. Economically, China is the second largest economy in the world, and is currently Japan’s second-largest export trade destination and largest import trade partner. According to statistics from the Japanese Customs, from January to September in 2019, the bilateral import and export volume of goods between Japan and China was of US$223.31 billion, with an increase of 0.7%. Japan’s exports to China were of US$97.47 billion, down 8.2%, and Japan’s imports from China were of US$125.85 billion, down 0.1%. What is more, Japan’s trade deficit with China is US$28.38 billion. It is obvious that the economic and trade links between China and Japan are close, and there are strong economic interdependence and complementarity. However, due to factors such as China-US trade frictions, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and COVID-19, not only the relationship between China and Japan but also the bilateral economy suffer from negative growth again. Therefore, if Japan forcibly helps the US promote the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, it may cause negative political and economic effects to itself.

Australia as a middle power always intends to shape itself into a regional power in the world, and enhance its voice in global governance. Therefore, as an ally of the US under the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, Australia often acts as the “vanguard” of the US, to assist the US in deterring and suppressing China in international affairs. Recently, as frictions between China and the US have upgraded, the relationship between China and Australia has dropped to the lowest point. In terms of diplomacy, Australia has been actively pro-US while anti-China. During the pandemic, Australia has followed the Trump administration closely to shift the blame on China. Economically, Australia advocates decoupling with China which would obviously damage trade relationship between the two countries. Therefore, Australia needs to weigh up whether it could afford the consequences if China-Australia relations continues to deteriorate. Australia’s tourism, education, resources, agricultural and livestock products, and many other industries are proactively related to constructive relations with China. If the decline in the political relationship between the two countries leads to deterioration in the business environment, Australia’s economy is bound to be negatively affected. In addition, Australia is a multicultural country with 1.2 million Chinese immigrants. The deterioration of China-Australia relations will inevitably lead to social disharmony.

To sum up, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” undoubtedly contributes to the development of Australia-Japan relations, and the cooperation between Australia and Japan also promotes the implementation of the US “Indo-Pacific Strategy” in return. But in assessing the merits and risks of the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, Australia and Japan need to be clear-minded, take a long-term view, and evaluate t the impact on their national interest if they adopt policies of hostility towards China.

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